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Quantum Erasure Cryptography
Hatim Salih *
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The phenomenon of quantum erasure has long intrigued physicists, but has
surprisingly found limited practical application. Here, we propose a protocol for
quantum key distribution (QKD) based on quantum erasure, promising inherent security
against detector attacks. We particularly demonstrate its security against a powerful
detector-blinding attack.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ideas at the root of quantum erasure were already at play in the famous Bohr-Einstein dialogue
in the 1920’s. In one such debate, Einstein envisaged a scenario where one could seemingly
observe interference fringes in a double-slit experiment, as well as learn which-path information
for individual photons [1]. Bohr countered, arguing that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle would
prevent one from doing exactly that. But as it later turned out, the deeper explanation was in fact
not uncertainty but rather entanglement—a concept Einstein himself helped put on the map in the
EPR paper [2].
In 1982 Scully and Druhl [3] proposed a variant of the double-slit experiment that sent
shock-waves through the physics community. The idea was that which-path information can be
inferred without disturbing the trajectory of individual particles, circumventing the uncertainty
argument. A simpler, subsequent proposal used excited atoms [4]. Scully and colleagues showed
that interference would still be lost due to entanglement providing a which-path “tag.” In the latter
proposal, the presence of an emitted photon in one of twomicrowave cavities placed directly behind
the two slits (with the cavities stretching long enough for the atoms to drop from their excited state)
would indicate which slit an atom went through. However, erasing this which-path information, by
removing a wall between the two cavities, would restore the interference fringes: quantum erasure.
While the original quantum erasure proposals have not been implemented, other more practical
ones have. For instance, Walborn et al. [5] directed photons, each from a polarization-entangled
pair, toward a double-slit. Each slit had a polarization rotator that imprinted a which-path tag.
Measuring the polarization of the other photon of the entangled pair in the right way erases which-
path information. Here, interference fringes can even be recovered long after the photons passing
through the double-slit have been detected.
Despite its fundamental significance, quantum erasure has for one reason or another struggled
for practical application. One notable exception is Zhao et al. recently employing a frequency eraser
to entangle, for the first time, different-color photons [6].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) on the other hand enables two remote parties
to share a random string of zeros and ones. Given such a string, provably secure
communication can be established [7]. Much of quantum cryptography thus reduces to
QKD. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol, the BB84 [8],
which has since been shown to be unconditionally secure against an eavesdropper with
unlimited resources [9]. However, imperfect devices, especially imperfect detectors, allow
powerful so called side-channel attacks that can compromise the security of QKD. Lydersen
et al. [10], for instance, showed how the secret key in two commercially available QKD
systems can be fully obtained using their detector-blinding attack, exploiting a common
detector imperfection. The protocol we propose here promises security against such attacks.
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2. METHODS
We now describe our erasure-based protocol for QKD. The
goal here for “Alice” and “Bob,” the customary communicating
parties in such tasks, is to securely share a random string of
zeros and ones. We start by explaining a simplified two-state
version of the protocol before proceeding to give the complete
four-state protocol. After sending her photon from the top left,
Alice encodes the bit value “0” by doing nothing, and encodes
the bit value “1” by turning on switchable polarization rotators
SPRA1 and SPRA2, applying rotations R(−π/2) and R(π/2) to
photon polarization in upper and lower paths respectively, as
shown in Figure 1. Bob on the other hand encodes the bit value
“1” by doing nothing, and encodes the bit value “0” by turning
on switchable polarization rotators SPRB1 and SPRB2, applying
rotations R(π/2) and R(−π/2) to the polarization qubit in the
upper and lower paths respectively.
More precisely, Alice starts by sending in a photon, using
single-photon source S1, in the state |0〉 |+45〉, where |0〉
corresponds to the photon being in the upper path, and |+45〉
corresponds to 45◦ polarization. After passing through Alice’s
50-50 beamsplitter, the state becomes 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉. If
Alice chooses the bit value “0,” not applying her rotations, the
state remains unchanged. If Alice chooses the bit value “1,”
applying her rotations, the state becomes 1√
2
|0〉 |H〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉.
See Figure 1. Crucially, the two states 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉 and
FIGURE 1 | Quantum erasure cryptography. After sending in her photon as
shown, Alice encodes bit value “0” by doing nothing, and encodes bit value
“1” by applying switchable polarization rotators SPRA1 and SPRA2. Bob
encodes bit value “1” by doing nothing, and encodes bit value “0” by applying
switchable polarization rotators SPRB1 and SPRB2. Which-path information
destroys interference, while the erasure of which-path information restores
interference. As explained in the text, for Alice sending in her photon from the
top left, D1 clicking uniquely corresponds to Alice and Bob agreeing in their bit
choices, and for Alice sending in her photon from the bottom left, D2 clicking
uniquely corresponds to Alice and Bob agreeing in their bit choices. S’s are
single-photon sources. MR’s are mirrors. BS’s are 50–50 beam-splitters.
Practically, the upper and lower arms of this interferometer would be
implemented using two optical cables, in which case there would be no need
for MR’s.
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉 are nonorthogonal and therefore cannot
be reliably distinguished by Eve [11].
For the case of Alice choosing the bit value “0,” sending
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉 into the channel, there is no which-path
information. If Bob does nothing, choosing the bit value “1,”
D2 clicks with certainty because of destructive interference at
D1. But if Bob applies his rotations, choosing the bit value
“0,” then which-path information is introduced in the form of
entanglement in 1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉. No interference takes
place: D1 and D2 are equally likely to click.
For the case of Alice choosing the bit value “1,” sending
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉 into the channel, there is which-path
information. If Bob applies his rotations, choosing the bit value
“0,” then which-path information is erased, resulting in the
state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉. D2 clicks with certainty because of
destructive interference at D1. But if Bob does nothing, choosing
the bit value “1,” we get no interference: D1 and D2 are equally
likely to click. Importantly, whenever D1 clicks, Alice and Bob
have agreed in their bit choices. Alice publicly instructs Bob to
keep the corresponding bits, which form our sifted key. Table 1
shows Alice and Bob’s random bit choices and corresponding
detector action.
This simplified two-state version is vulnerable to a simple Eve
attack. She can make the exact measurement as Bob using two
polarization rotators, a 50–50 beamsplitter, and two detectors.
For Eve not applying her rotations, whenever her equivalent of
Bob’s D1 clicks, she knows Alice has sent her entangled state; Eve
sends the entangled state. If Eve’s other detector clicks, she sends
nothing. The case of Eve applying her rotations is analogous. This
way Eve can obtain the full key.
We are ready to give our quantum erasure cryptography
protocol, using four states. Alice now sends her photon either
from the top using S1, or from the bottom using S2, with
equal probability. After Bob makes his measurement, Alice
announces publicly which photons were sent from the top
and which from the bottom. For photons sent from the top,
as before, bits corresponding to D1 clicking are kept while
the rest are thrown away. For photons sent from the bottom,
bits corresponding to D2 clicking are kept while the rest
are thrown away. More precisely, the protocol proceeds as
follows:
1. With probability 1/4 Alice sends Bob one of four possible
states: 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉 or 1√
2
(|1〉 − |0〉) |+45〉, which are
TABLE 1 | Detector action for different bit choices by Alice and Bob for the
case of Alice sending in her photon from the top as shown in Figure 1.
Alice’s bit choice Bob’s bit choice Detector clicking
0 0 D1 or D2
0 1 D2
1 0 D2
1 1 D1 or D2
D1 clicking uniquely corresponds to Alice and Bob making the same bit choices.
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both unentangle, or 1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉, or 1√
2
|1〉 |V〉 −
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉, which are both entangled. She encodes bit value
“0” by sending Bob one of the unentangled states, and bit value
“1” by sending one of the entangled states.
2. Bob encodes bit value “0” by making the measurement
corresponding to applying his polarization rotators,
and encodes bit value “1” by making the measurement
corresponding to not applying his polarization rotators.
3. Alice announces whether she initially sent her photon from
the the top using S1 or from the bottom using S2.
4. Bob announces which of his two detectors clicked for each
photon.
5. For photons sent from the top using S1, bits corresponding to
D1 clicking are kept. For photons sent from the bottom using
S2, bits corresponding to D2 clicking are kept instead. Those
bits that are kept form the sifted key. The rest are thrown away.
6. Alice randomly chooses a sample from the sifted key. Alice
and Bob publicly announce corresponding bits. If error rate
exceeds some threshold they then abort protocol and start
over.
7. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy
amplification to obtain the final secure key.
During peer-review of the present paper a one-qubit protocol
[12] was brought to our attention that shares an important
feature with our two-qubit protocol; the secure key is extracted
from measurement choices rather than measurement outcomes.
Whereas for both protocols three out of four photons are on
average thrown away, in our two-qubit protocol two out of the
three photons that are to be thrown away can be used to check
for an attack by Eve as shown in the next section.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We discuss two attacks by Eve. First an intercept-resend
attack, then a powerful detector-blinding attack. Consider Eve
employing an intercept-resend strategy where, just like Bob, she
brings the two paths together, randomly choosing to either apply
identical rotations to Bob’s or not apply any before her beam-
splitter and two detectors which are also identical to Bob’s. Take
the case of Eve not applying her rotations and her lower detector
clicking. The detector could have equally been triggered by an
unentangled state or by an entangled one. But one of the two
unentangled states, which allow interference to take place, can
be ruled out. Therefore, by assuming that Alice has sent the
other entangled state, in this case the one corresponding to
Alice sending in her photon from the top and not applying her
rotations, Eve is correct with probability 1/2. She sends this state
to Bob. The case of Eve not applying her rotations and her upper
detector clicking is analogous; she sends to Bob Alice’s other
unentangled state, that is the one corresponding to Alice sending
in her photon from the bottom and not applying her rotations.
For the case of Eve applying her rotations, if her lower detector
clicks she sends Alice’s entangled state corresponding to Alice
sending in her photon from the top and applying her rotations.
And if Eve’s upper detector clicks she sends Alice’s entangled state
corresponding to Alice sending in her photon from the bottom
and applying her rotations.
Let’s now work out the probability of Bob’s detector D1
incorrectly clicking for the case of Alice sending in her photon
from the top. Eve sends the wrong state with probability 1/2.
Based on Alice and Bob’s bit choices, there is a 1/2 chance that the
state incident on Bob’s beam-splitter should be the unentangled
state, corresponding to Alice and Bob not agreeing on their
bit choices, leading to destructive interference at Bob’s D1. The
probability of Eve incorrectly triggering D1 is therefore 1/2 ×
1/2 × 1/2 = 1/8. The probability of Eve correctly triggering D1
in this case is 1/4, corresponding to Alice and Bob agreeing on
their bit choices. (1/8 due to Eve sending correct state plus 1/8
due to Eve sending wrong state.) By symmetry, The probability
of Eve incorrectly triggering D2 for the case of Alice sending in
her photon from the bottom is also 1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/8.
The probability of Eve correctly triggering D2 in this case is 1/4,
corresponding to Alice and Bob agreeing on their bit choices.
(1/8 due to Eve sending correct state plus 1/8 due to Eve sending
wrong state.) Given this attack, the error rate in the sifted key,
called the quantum bit error rate or QBER, is 1/8÷ 3/8 = 1/3.
We now show that our protocol is secure against this
intercept-resend attack. Starting with the sifted key, the classical
algorithms of error correction and privacy amplification can
be used to generate a secure key—as long as Bob has more
information than Eve [13]. More precisely, Bob’s mutual Shannon
information I(α, β) has to be greater than Eve’s mutual Shannon
information I(α, ǫ) which is given by,
I(α, ǫ) = 1+
∑
r= 0,1,0′,1′
P(r)
∑
i= 0,1
P(r|i)P(i)
P(r)
log2
P(r|i)P(i)
P(r)
(1)
where P(i) is the probability of Alice sending bit i to Bob, with
i being either 0 or 1. P(r) is the probability of Eve getting
measurement outcome r, with r being either 0 or 1 for Eve not
applying her rotations, or 0′ or 1′ for Eve applying her rotations,
where 0, 0′ correspond to bit value “0,” and 1, 1′ correspond
to bit value “1.” P(r|i) is the probability of Eve getting r given
Alice’s bit i. With Eve’s strategy, P(r = 0) is 3/8, P(r = 1)
is 1/8, P(r = 0′) is 1/8, P(r = 1′) is 3/8, P(i = 0) is 1/2,
P(i = 1) is 1/2, P(r = 0|i = 0) is 1/2, P(r = 1|i = 0) is 0,
P(r = 0′|i = 0) is 1/4, P(r = 1′|i = 0) is 1/4, P(r = 0|i = 1)
is 1/4, P(r = 1|i = 1) is 1/4, P(r = 0′|i = 1) is 0, P(r =
1′|i = 1) is 1/2. Eve’s information gain I(α, ǫ) is therefore 0.311.
Alice and Bob randomly choose a sample of the sifted key, which
would be thrown away. If for this sample the estimated QBER <
33.3%, and the estimated I(α, β) > 0.311, they proceed with the
classical algorithms of error correction and privacy amplification
to generate their secure key, otherwise they stop the protocol.
While for Bennett and Brassard’s BB84 QKD protocol [8], for
comparison, only one out of two photons is thrown away in order
to get the sifted key, in our protocol three out of four photons are
thrown away. For this price, however, Eve’s QBER in our erasure-
based protocol is higher than that for BB84, and Eve’s information
gain is lower. For a typical intercept-resend strategy by Eve on
BB84, Eve’s QBER is 25% for an information gain I(α, ǫ) of 1/2,
compared to a QBER of 33.3% for an information gain I(α, ǫ) of
0.311 in our protocol.
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We have mentioned that Alice and Bob can make use of two
out of the three photons that are to be thrown away on average,
to check for an attack by Eve.When Alice and Bobmake opposite
bit choices, which means interference should take place, Bob
measures polarization in the +45, −45 basis. He should always
measure+45. (Bob canmake thismeasurement by replacing each
of his detectors by a 45◦ polarization rotator, which leads to a
polarizing beam-splitter, which in turn leads to two detectors.)
For Eve’s intercept-resend attack above, Eve sends the wrong state
half the time on average. This means Bob would measure −45
polarization with 25% probability, alerting him to Eve’s attack.
Let us now look at Eve’s detector-blinding attack inspired by
Lydersen et al. [10]. Eve performs the same measurement as
in the intercept-resend attack discussed above. Her information
gain I(α, ǫ) therefore remains the same, 0.31. By means of high
intensity light, Eve blinds Bob’s detectors, causing them to only
click for pulses of light with intensity above a given threshold.
With probability 1/2 Eve correctly guesses Alice’s state. Say Eve
guesses that Alice sent an unentangled state, that is bit value “0.”
She sends a strong enough pulse made up entirely of only one of
Alice’s two entangled states chosen such that if Bob’s bit is also “0,”
which corresponds to Bob applying his rotations, the whole pulse
will end up at D1(D2) for the case of Alice sending her photon
from top(bottom). If on the other hand Bob chooses bit value “1,”
which corresponds to him not applying his rotations, roughly half
of Eve’s signal would go to one detector while the other half would
go to the other detector. The intensity of Eve’s pulse is chosen
such that half the intensity is below the threshold for triggering
either detector. No detector clicks. But Eve sends the wrong state
to Bob roughly half the time on average. In this case, if Alice and
Bob choose the same bit no detector clicks for the same reason.
If, however, Alice and Bob choose different bits, which is half
the time on average, the probability of Eve incorrectly triggering
D1(D2) for the case of Alice sending in her photon from the
top(bottom) is 1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/8. The probability of Eve
correctly triggeringD1(D1) on the other hand is 1/2×1/2 = 1/4.
The QBER is therefore 1/8 ÷ (1/4 + 1/8) = 1/3. As before,
for their sample of the sifted key, if estimated QBER < 33.3%,
and estimated I(α, β) > 0.311, Alice and Bob proceed with the
classical algorithms of error correction and privacy amplification
to generate their secure key, otherwise they stop the protocol.
By comparison, against the BB84, the detector-blinding attack
enables Eve to obtain the full secret key without introducing any
errors.
What about attacks whose aim is to learn which of Bob’s
detectors clicked? Because for each photon Bob publicly
announces which detector clicked, if any, such attacks by Eve are
not relevant. In fact, no bit-value information is encoded in the
photon incident on Bob’s beam-splitter. Bob’s beam-splitter and
two detectors, it seems, might as well be handed to Eve—as long
as the module containing his two polarization rotators is kept
secure. A general proof of the security of our protocol is planned
for a separate paper.
In summary, we have proposed an erasure-based protocol for
quantum key distribution that promises inherent security against
side-channel detector attacks, analyzing its security against Eve’s
intercept-resend attack as well as her more powerful detector-
blinding attack.
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